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ABSTRACT 
In a mean-variance portfolio choice model, each  of  3,578 households 
from  the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances has calculated preferences  over 
housing, other consumption, and risk.  Each household  is constrained such 
that any owner-occupied housing  in portfolio must match housing services 
consumed.  Corporate taxes are modeled in some detail, and regression 
coefficients  are used  to estimate the adjusted gross income, itemizable 
deductions,  and statutory marginal  tax rate of  each household. 
General equilibrium  simulation results indicate that inflation does not 
necessarily  increase total owner housing.  Top-bracket households  increase 
their owner housing, while others switch into bonds.  The greater number  of 
households  in  low-brackets implies that the homeownership rate can fall even 
if  the amount  of owner housing rises. 
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Traditional models  of  housing and taxation find that inflation raises 
the cost  of  business capital, reduces the cost  of  homeownership,  and shifts 
capital toward owner-occupied  housing.  Results froa theoretical  (Feldstein, 
1982) and econometric  (Summers, 1981) models  suggest that inflation raises 
the net return  to housing.  In  a general equilibrium model with  multiple 
consumers,  Hendershott and  Hu (1983) simulate the amount of  the shift toward 
houaing.  In  a partial equilibrium model with  housing supply, Poterba  (1984) 
finds  that a large fraction of  housing price appreciation can  be  explained 
by its preferential  tax treatment with inflation. 
In  general,  the cost of  business capital rises because of  historical 
cost  depreciation,  FIFO  inventory accounting, and the taxation of  nominal 
capital gains.  The cost of  housing falls, essentially because nominal 
interest payments are deducted while capital gains are untaxed. 
In  this paper, we show  that these conclusions do not necessarily  hold. 
We  use a very  disaggregate  general equilibrium model of  household portfolio 
choice.  Inflation does not raise the cost of  business capital in  this 
model,  deapite nominal depreciation and capital gains taxes, because the 
greater interest deductions at  the 46 percent corporate rate outweigh the 
combined taxation of  household nominal interest receipts.  In  the "open 
economy" model, where  the real interest rate is fixed by international flows 
of  debt,  inflation actually reduces the net cost of  funds and thus the 
corporate  cost of  capital.  High tax brackets are still encouraged  to own 
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housing, but low brackets  shift into bonds.  Aggregate housing  does 
increase with  inflation in  this model. 
The model assumes perfect markets in a single period with  fixed labor, 
fixed wealth, constant returns to scale production, and no excess profits. 
It  makes four important contributions, however.  First, any owner-occupied 
housing in a  portfolio  is constrained  to match that household's  consumption 
of  housing services in  utility.  Second, rather than  rely on 10 or 20 
"representative"  consumers, we  calculate preference parameters  for each  of 
3,578 observations from  the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances and evaluate 
supplies and  demands for each household at each  trial price vector.  Third, 
we  integrate econometric  estimation of  parameters with  calibration methods 
that insure overall consistency of  the benchmark equilibrium.  Fourth, we 
model  the actual 1983 tax law including detailed provisions  of  the corporate 
tax system, estimation of  each household's adjusted gross  income, endogenous 
decisions to itemize deductions,  determination of each  household's  tax 
bracket at each  iteration, and  calculation of  tax paid  from  the schedule. 
These  contributions turn out to be important for our results.  In  the 
"closed economy" version of  our model, inflation helps the poor  by raising 
the real interest rate and hurts the rich  by  reducing their real after-tax 
returns.  The sama  relative effects appear in  the "open economy" version. 
Also,  tenure choice in  our logit model is  determined primarily by income and 
demographic  factors, while  the amount of  housing is affetted by taxes and 
relative returns.  This distinction is important for an increase in  the rate 
of  inflation, because the greater number  of households  in  low tax bracketa 
causes a slight decrease in  the total number of owner-occupants,  while the 
greater wealth  in  high tax brackets leads to a  slight  increase in  the total 
amount of  owner housing. -3- 
I, The Model 
Each  household  allocates its fixed wealth to a vector of  assets  A, 
including positive  or negative riskless deht  D  and nonnegative  amounts of 
risky corporate equity  E, rental housing  R,  and owner housing  OH.  The 
vector  of  net returns is  r — (r0,  rE rR r0).  Following Slemrod (1982) 
and Cordon  and Slemrod (1983), consumers maximize: 
U(C,H,A)  —  COHI2 -  flu2  (1) 
using labor and capital  income plus transfers minus taxes, where  H  is 
housing services,  C  is other  (corporate) consumption,  fi  is a parameter of 
risk aversion, and  2  is the variance of income.  This variance  is 
calculated from  A'XA, where  is  a pre-specified varisnce-covsrisnce 
matrix  that is affected by  taxes.  Observed rental holdings  do not follow a 
strict mean-variance  framework, so we  add a  household  specific intercept  1 
to rental holdings.  Also, because the typical taxpayer holds only  a subset 
of these assets, we consider the choice among eight  "regimes," with  and 
without holding  each of  the three risky assets.  The household  first chooses 
the best  allocation  of  wealth  and consumption within each  regime, and then 
it chooses the regime with  the highest overall utility: 
max  max  [ U. (C. HiAi) +  (2) 
i—l,8 
L c  ,H.  A.  J 
1  1  1 
subject to an  income  constraint on  spending  C + PHH  a wealth  constraint on 
A, and where  5 represents transaction cost or  other reason  to neglect 
particular assets in  regime i.  Note that the choice among regimes includes -4- 
the choice about whether to owner-occupy.  First order conditions are used 
to solve for demands in the four renter regimes, but the extra constraint 
that  H — OH  prevents analytical solution in  the four owner regimes.  Thus 
we iterate to find  the utility maximizing amount of housing for each of the 
four  owner regimes for each household, for each trial price vector. 
In  the competitive corporate  sector, output is produced according to: 
C  —  + p 
where  is  the  must of  corporate equity and debt, in  fixed proportions,  L 
is total labor supply, and  p  is a random element with  mean  zero.  Civen 
that  L  is fixed, we can solve for capital demand  and the equilibrium wage. 
Taxes  include a flat 10 percent payroll tax on  business use of labor, 
and a corporate tax at  rate  u  (—  .46)  on  income from five assets including 
equipment,  structures, land, inventories, and intangibles.  Each  asset 
depreciates at  exponential  rate  d  and receives allowances with  present 
value  z.  Following Hall  and  Jorgenson  (1967),  the coat of capital is: 
rC 
— (r+d)(l-k-uz)/(l-u) 
-  d  and  (4a) 
— [(r+ir) 
+ b(r+,r)(l-u)]/(l+b) 
-  lv  ,  (4b) 
where  k (—.1) is an investment tax credit for equipment,  b (—.5) is the 
debt/equity  ratio, iv  is the rate of  inflation, r 
is the real  return to 
equity, and  rt  is the real markat interest rate.  Fullerton and Lyon 
(1988)  provide parameter values  as well as weights  for the five assets. 
The Survey of Consumer Finances provides much information on  asset 
holdings,  but no data  on  personal taxes.  We found 20 income and demographic -5- 
variables  that  appeared both in this survey and in the Treasury Department's 
individual  tax file, an  extensive elaboration of 195,000 actual  tax returns 
that includes imputations  for house value, rent paid,  itemizable deductions 
of  nonitemizers,  and other information.  The Treasury was able to run 24  OLS 
regressions  for us, using the 20 selected variables  to  predict adjuated 
gross income  after exemptions, and to  predict itemizable deductions;  for 
single, married,  and head  of  household filers; for renters and for owners; 
and for both the 1983 law and the Tax Reform Act of  1986.  See Berkovec and 
Fullerton  (1988) for more detail  on the model and the 1986 Act. 
For each  household  in our sample, we apply the Treasury  coefficients to 
obtain  AOl and itemizahle deductions.  The latter is compared to  the 
standard deduction,  and the remaining tax base  is applied to the statutory 
rate  brackets  to  determine the marginal rate  r  and actual  tax paid.  The 
four real net rates of  return for that household are then: 
rD 
— (rt-f-w)(l.r) 
- iv  (5a) 
r5 
— (r+iv)[e(l-g)  + (1-e)(l-r)] 




-  d  (Sc) 
r0 
— r 
-  m  -  d  -  t(l-Ir)  (Sd) 
where  e  (—.5) is  the fraction of corporate earnings retained, g (—.  2r)  is 
the effective  rate on  accrued capital gains, m (—.01) is maintenance,  and t 
(—.018) is property  tax.  For the landlord, rental income after maintenance 
and property  taxes is subject to rate  r, while purely nominal capital gains 
are taxed at rate  g.  For the owner, imputed rents are untaxed, capital 
gains are untaxed, and  property taxes are deducted by  itemizers  (I—i). -6- 
We use Treasury coefficients and all initial asset holdings for taxable 
income in  the base  case, but equstions (5)  govern changes in  simulation.  In 
the variance-covarisnce  mstrix, each row and each  column involving equity is 
multiplied by [e(l-g)+(l-e)(l-r)], those involving rental housing are 
multiplied by (l-g)/(l-rz), and those for owner housing are unaffected by 
taxes.  We  use Newton's  algorithm to solve for  r, r, q  snd  a  tax scalar 
used  in  the simulations to  adjust marginal tax rates by  just enough  to keep 
all government activities  fixed with a  balanced budget.  The rent  r 
is 
also used  for  r, and the the wage derives from  equation (3). 
The initial real  interest rate and inflation rate  are each set at  5 
percent.  Based  on Ibottson  and  Siegel (1983), we set the real return  to 
equity at  12 percent.  The assumed rent is II  percent, yielding 7.2 percent 
after maintenance,  depreciation, and property tax.  Our 198&  paper provides 
the variance-covariance  matrix  and describes how each  household's  holdings 
are used  to  solve  for its  a,  fi,  and  y.  The  6.  are assumed to  be 
functions of  exogenous variables such as  wealth,  age,  and household  size. 
These parameters are estimated by a logit model which  is used  to predict 
regime probabilities  for each  household as a function of the exogenous 
variables and of  13.  calculated from equation (1).  These probabilities  are 
then used  in  the simulations.  That is,  each household is weighted by  regime 
probabilities  as well  as by  corrected sample weights.  The probabilities in 
the benchmark  equilibrium  aggregate to a 62  percent homeownership rate 
overall, with  a range from 38  percent for households with  incomes under 
$5,000 per year  to  89 percent for those over $200,000 per year. 
Finally, the government  in this model collects taxes, provides  lump-sum 
transfers to each  household,  provides rental housing, uses debt, and buys 
some corporate output.  Each of these amounts is fixed in  the simulations. -7- 
The government's rental housing  is set as the otiginal difference between 
household ownership and household demand; its debt is set as the original 
difference between household supply and corporate demand; its purchases  are 
set as the original difference between tax revenue and other expenses. 
IT. Results 
In  the base  case, untaxed households earn  10 percent nominal interest 
before  5  percent inflation, while  top bracket households  earn 5 percent 
after-tax before  5 percent inflation (for a zero real net return).  Still, 
owner housing constitutes  the largest asaet for all income groups up to  the 
top ($200,000/year)  group, which holds more  equity and rental housing. 
Table  1 shows selected results from the closed economy model where  the 
5 percent  inflation was changed to zero or 10 percent, with  no other changes 
in  parameters  or  tax rules.  These simulations  give some indication of the 
effects of  inflation through a given tax system, and the zero inflation 
simulations  indicate the effects of  a policy change to complete indexation. 
Most results are expressed as ratios of the simulated value to the base 
value,  so the first row indicates that no inflation (or full indexation) 
would reduce  the real interest rate received by  untaxed households by 45 
percent,  and that an increaae from S to 10 percent inflation would increase 
their real  return  by 57 percent.  Since untaxed households  receive the 
actual market  returns which are shown at the bottom  of the table, these 
percentages  correspond to real interest rates of  .0275,  .05,  and .0796, for 
inflation rates of  zero, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  Since inflation 
increases the real return to debt  without a big effect on  other assets, it 
increases the capital income and utility of  low—bracket households. -8- 
At  the other end of  the income scale, inflation reduces the reel net 
interest rate from  .014 at no inflation to - .010  at 10 percent inflation. 
The table shows that the real net rate of  return for top-bracket households 
falls  for all four assets  (but it falls least for owner-occupied  housing). 
Inflation reduces their capital income and utility.  Thus the first general 
result we  wish to emphasize is that moderate inflation seems to have  a 
progressive  effect in the redistribution of  capital income.  (The wage rate 
does not change very  much, but we have  not  modeled other effects such  as 
sticky wages,  trensfers, or  prices.) 
In  the closed economy model, the effect of  inflation on the nominal 
interest rate (3i/Dir) must be  greater than one in order to maintain a real 
after-tax interest rate.  Empirical estimates suggest that interest rates 
rise only  point-for-point with  inflation, however.  To  capture this 
alternative, we  model  a stylized "open" economy where the real  interest rate 
is fixed at  5 percent by international flows of  debt (Hansaon and Stuart, 
1986).  Equity and housing returns still vary,  as they must be  owned 
domestically.  Our first result about the progressive  effect of inflation is 
also clear in  the open  economy version of  our model. 
The bottom of  the table for the closed economy indicates thst inflation 
raises  the corporate cost  of  capital (r0) only  slightly.  We  capture the 
effect  of  historical  cost depreciation, but this effect was over-estimated 
in  models with  only  depreciable assatg such as equipment and structures. 
The weight on  these assets is reduced here by the addition of  inventories, 
land, and intangibles.  We use only LIFO inventory accounting,  assuming that 
firma would  minimize taxes, and we  include the taxation of purely  nominal 
capital gains.  In  this model, these tax-increasing effects of  inflation are 
almost completely offset by the tax-reducing effect  that nominal interest is -9- 
deducted at  the corporation's  46 percent rate and included by  households at 
much  lower rates. If  firms were  allowed to increase their debt/equity  ratio, 
we  might expect  the cost of capital to fall.  In  the open economy model, 
fixed real interest rates mean that  inflation actually reduces the cost of 
finance and cost  of  capital. Thus our second general point is that inflation 
does not necessarily  raise the cost of business capital.  It does not even 
increase the relative return to homeowning  for low-tax brackets, although it 
does increase the relative return to  homeowning for high-tax brackets. 
The middle part  of the table indicates that untaxed households nearly 
eliminate their interest bearing assets at no inflation, and double them at 
high  inflation.  Equity and rental holdings are reduced the most  at  high 
inflation.  Because of  the incentive to hold  bonds,  the number  of homeowners 
in  this bracket falls by 4 percent while the amount of  owner housing falls 
by 9 percent.  Thus  low-income groups do  not experience the incentive 
effects of inflation discussed for high-bracket groups in  most of  the 
literature.  Whether inflation increases owner housing becomes an  empirical 
question that depends on the relative number  and wealth  of  households  in 
each tax situation.  It  also becomes important to measure  carefully the 
actual marginal  tax rates they face. 
Our model  includes 3,578 weighted individual households,  each with 
specific asset holdings,  adjusted gross income, and marginal tax rate.  We 
cannot show  disaggregate results here, but the table shows  the two extremes. 
In  the 50  percent marginal  rate bracket, when inflation reduces all real net 
returns except  that of owner housing, households reduce bond  holdings 
dramatically.  They  would like to switch most capital into owner housing as 
an  asset, but they are constrained in  this model to  consume an  equal amount 
of  housing services.  This constraint turns out to  be important, because it -10- 
limits  the high-bracket  shift into owner housing.  Thus they add more  rental 
housing to portfolios and increase owner housing by  only 15 percent (when 
inflation increases to 10 percent).  The next  part of  the table indicates 
that  low and  high  tax brackets offset each other  in such  a way that none  of 
the four assets changes much  in total.  The third general point we wish  to 
emphasize  is that inflation does  increase  the capital allocated to owner 
housing  in this model.  However, it does increase owner housing by  10 
percent  in the open economy version of our model. 
Our estimation of  the logit model reveals that households  are more 
likely to  shift  in and  out of equity or rental housing than they are to 
shift  in and  out of  homeownership.  As  might be expected, income and 
demographic  characteristics  are the major determinants of  tenure choice. 
The fourth main  point  of our  paper, revealed in the table, is  that taxes 
have a small effect on  homeownership rates but more effect on  housing per 
owner  (but housing prices are held  fixed in  this model).  This distinction 
is missed  by Rosen  and  Rosen  (1980) and others who estimate the effect of 
relative price changes on  homeownership rates only. 
Finally, our model emphasizes the importance of  using  individual 
households  and their separate amounts of wealth.  When  inflation increases 
from  5 to 10 percent, low-bracket households shift out of  owner  housing 
while  high-bracket households  shift into owner housing.  The sheer number of 
low-bracket  households  causes a decrease in  the total number  of owners, 
while  the wealth  of  the high-bracket households leads to a slight increaso 
in  the amount of  owner housing. Table 1 
Net Rates of  Return  and Asset Holdings 
Reported as Ratio to their Values in  the Base Case 
(Closed Economy Model) 
Inflation Rates 
0  5 
0.552  1.0 
1.026  1.0 
1.039  1.0 
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1.0  2.194 
1.0  0.481 
1.0  0.262 
1.0  0.909 
1.0  0.959 
1,0  0.313 
1.0  0.981 
1.0  1.277 
1.0  1.146 
1.0  0.999 
1.0  0.975 
1.0  0.948 
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1.0  1.006 
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